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ABSTRACT
The most significant changes in the JNA and the way they were carried
out so that it could become a Serbian imperial force are identified and
explained. The following is emphasized for its significance: (1) reorganiza-
tion of the “ideological equality” type military; (2) the characteristics and
the purpose of the reorganization that had been put into effect before the
idea of creating “Greater Serbia” was made public; (3) war plans and the
role of military strategy and its theoretical, organizational and trial foun-
dation; (4) the implementation of such strategy in the aggression against
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Within the aforementioned, the Serbian strategic idea is explained,
i.e. “...that  in a low intensity conflict, including the prevention and elimi-
nation of extraordinary events, and counterstrikes from distance, the
enemy be decisively defeated and Yugoslavia protected,” which makes up
the operational plan for the employment of JNA.
Regarding the implementation of the plan in the aggression against
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the segment that is invisible, not always
recognizable, in a word covert, but crucial for making own strategic deci-
sions, is explained. The covert nature of the plan is always a good basis
for debate, in which the exchange of ideas and views is a continuos
process, and the result questionable. Therefore, it is essayed in this work
to bring to light this other, less visible side.  
The First Stage in the Transformation of the JNA (Yugoslav People’s
Army) into a Serbian Imperial Force
Any systematic analysis of the plans, preparations and role of
the JNA in the aggression against Croatia should provide an
answer not only as to how it was planned, but also an insight into
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the characteristics of the military, which became an instrument of
aggressive politics. 
A number of contemporary authors have written about the
peculiarities of military organizations and professions. In this par-
ticular case, one must delve into the “nature” of the military and
its dependence on the prevailing social system; that is, an insight
should be gained from a sociological point of view.1 Different
models of the fundamental social relationship (domination as
opposed to equality) and their variations produce different types
of military organizations, in regard both to the political role of the
military factor, as well as their external aspect, the type of man-
agement and the mechanisms of achieving unity - i.e. the object
of identification of the military personnel.
Theoretician M.D. Feld has based his “typology of military
organizations” on the differences in the political environments in
which armed forces are formed and used.2 There is no doubt that
the JNA belonged to the “ideological equality - all-embracing”
type organization. What are the characteristics of that particular
type and other similar militaries?
In a socialist (communist) structure – as is also the case in the
structures of non-socialist totalitarian societies which are charac-
terized by ideological equality, the party is perceived as a synthe-
sizer and the supreme overseer of both the state and society. The
distribution of power, including between the military and society, is
determined by the expressions of individual affiliation to the pro-
grammatic objectives of the ruling party. The political, fundamen-
tal structure of ideological equality as a whole, including the mil-
itary, can indeed be seen as an all-embracing society.  The socie-
ty demands of all its members a full commitment to social trans-
formation, and organizations and individuals that refuse to com-
ply are treated as potential or actual enemies.
The significance of individual judgement and decision-mak-
ing abilities is negated in a specific manner. An individual insight,
even if it might result in a direct benefit, is denigrated as an infe-
rior level of knowledge. The most valued insight is the one which
is derived from the party program objectives. An obvious conse-
quence of this is that “rank is the official measure of conviction”
and that there must be a total correspondence between the struc-
tures of the military, the party and the state. The political role of
an army founded on the principles of ideological equality is pri-
marily to promote the ruling ideology.3 Hence, the army protects
those who adhere to the idea, and is suspicious of, or overtly hos-
tile toward, those who do not.
The image emanating from the management within such a
system comes in the form of charisma. A military official is a “nat-
ural” leader and represents the embodiment of conviction.4 As the


























ure, a person who has no right to make a mistake. His control is
based upon the principle of seniority - embodied in the personal-
ity – and the creation of balance and harmony among his subor-
dinates. Success and failure are the product of repeated develop-
ment of prior actions and affirmation of the core issues and their
significance as long-term goals.
The social model of the military is that, aside from obvious dif-
ferences in duties and responsibilities, it is an open and equal
community of all those who promote common goals. Obviously,
the equality is not and cannot be absolute (“some are more equal
than others”), but there are no nonfunctional differences in status
among different categories of members.  Such an army is pro-
claimed to be and perceived as the People s Army.
Members of the military are bound to military and social goals
at the level of larger formations.5 The identification is not only
with the unit, but with commanders as well.  This creates feelings
of rivalry, so it is in the best interest of an individual that the
authority of their superiors increase.  Charisma assumes a practi-
cal application, as an individual’s promotion becomes condition-
al upon the ability of his superiors to ensure promotion for their
subordinates, irrespective of their actual performance.
The distribution of power and decision-making mechanisms is
most certainly the most important aspect of the relationship
between the military and society. Regardless of the nature of social
organization, the type of political doctrine or even the level of
economic development, the modern world agrees that this power,
in principle, should be distributed in favor of society, not only dur-
ing peacetime, but also during time of war. The differences
emerge from attempts to determine an optimum model of con-
trol.6
Socialism (communism) is characterized by the so-called sub-
jective control over the structure of national defense. The armed
forces are a constitutive element of society, “the armed people”,
the segment which is not allowed a great deal of specialization
and hence separation and isolation from the community. Every cit-
izen has an equal duty to contribute to his own defense. At the
same time, officers do not differ in terms of their social status and
psychological profile from other society members and they share
with them all the prevailing values. Under such circumstances, the
military structure tends to spread across society. High military offi-
cials think within political frameworks, and high government offi-
cials, in turn, do not hesitate to resolve military issues.7 In societies
of ideological equality, which are characterized by subjective con-
trol, the defense function is exercised through direct means. The
basis for the realization of military unity is a combination of





























Transformation of the JNA from an “Ideological Equality-Type”
Military into a Serbian Imperial Force
Given the fact that the JNA had all the characteristics of an
“ideological equality - type” army, its transformation into a
Serbian imperial force was a long and systematic process which
took place at the following levels: (a) language; (b) national com-
position; (c) administrative and officer corps; and (d) war doctrine.
In a multinational community as was former Yugoslavia, the
equality of peoples was guaranteed at the formal legal level. The
armed forces were no exception to this (per the Service in Armed
Forces Act and other regulations). A significant violation appeared
in the area of the official language, which has a strategic signifi-
cance from the ethnic point of view. The official language of the
armed forces was “Serbo-Croatian”, which could be rationalized
by the need for uniformity of command and the fact that the lan-
guage was spoken and understood by the majority of the popula-
tion of former Yugoslavia. In essence, however, this constituted a
complete and systematic “Serbianization” of all the non-Serb
members of the armed forces.
In addition to the language, another obvious example of
inequality was the ethnic composition of the JNA officer corps.
The percentages were as follows: Serbs 63.2%, Montenegrins
6.2%, Macedonians 6.3%, Croats 12.6%, Slovenes 2.8%,
Muslims 2.4%, Yugoslavs 3.6%, Albanians 0.6%, Hungarians
0.7% and others 1.6%. The issue of ethnic structure of the Army
and Territorial Defense (TO) officer corps in a multiethnic state, as
was Yugoslavia, called for a proportional representation of the
various nationalities. It is obvious that the representation was not
only disproportional, but also that this was an intentional act to
deprive entire nationalities, particularly the Croats, of just repre-
sentation.  This deprivation would reach its peak between 1986
and 1990, i.e. after the SANU Memorandum and the reorgani-
zation of the armed forces, when the percentage of Serbs in the
total JNA officer corps surpassed 70%.
This long-term, intentional deprivation was evident both at the
management and commanding levels of majors, brigadiers and
generals. There was a continuous ideological, political and social
homogenization of the officer corps as well, which strove for pro-
Yugoslav (pro-Serbian) socialization and was carried out in a
planned and subtle manner. This socialization consisted of a long-
term service away from the person’s own cultural, civilizational
and national environment, which is the only obvious explanation
for the “consistent” need for transfers and active service far from
one’s home area.  This resulted in the penetration of Serbs into
areas where it was felt the national structure of the population had
to be changed. The Greater-Serbian orientation of the highest-
ranking officers was achieved not only by giving precedence to110
those of Serbian (or Montenegrin) nationality, but also in terms of
their education. Military academies regularly emphasized Serbian
history and glorified the heroic achievements of the Serbian Army.
An integral part of this plan was the principle by which the major-
ity of conscripts served outside their respective republics, the idea
being to create new potential Yugoslavs whose mission would be
to defend “every nook and cranny” of Yugoslavia.
At the level of war doctrine (strategy), a Copernican revolution
took place in the 80s with the appearance of a new player on the
world scene: information. However, it seems that as far as the JNA
was concerned, military operations such as Eagle Claw, Prairie
Fire, El Dorado Canyon, Peace for Galilee, Corporate and, final-
ly, Desert Storm, had never taken place. The fundamental strate-
gic postulate continued to be that “the peace-time army is equiv-
alent to the army at war.”8 This viewpoint reveals the nature of the
JNA and the role it was to play in the attainment of the Greater-
Serbian goals. In addition to its ponderousness and its obsoles-
cence in technological, organizational and doctrinal aspects, it
was the conservatism of the JNA which exerted the most influence
on the form that the active military cadre assumed. The process
was twofold - the creation of a massive army with an outdated
organization and doctrine was largely driven by the psychological,
sociological and educational profile of the active military cadre.
Within such a military organization, anti-intellectualism was very
prominent.9 This would have a major impact on the operational
capabilities, since there existed no well-defined doctrine or train-
ing program. This situation was further exacerbated by the firm
traditionalism of the military. A continuing strong bond with the
revolutionary accomplishments of the NOB (National Liberation
War), and the focus on ideological and political work, were
among the main reasons for the dogmatic approach with regard
to the operational doctrine and the tactical use of formations.
Final Stage in the Transformation of the Yugoslav People’s Army
into the Serbian Imperial Force
The early 80s saw the final stage of the transformation of the
JNA into the Greater Serbian imperial armed force. This was
shaped by two fundamental factors:
1) The reorganization of the armed forces in late 1986 and early
1987. Armies, divisions and regiments were abolished and
replaced by military regions, corps and brigades.
2) The issuing of the Strategy of the Total National Defense and
Social Self-Protection of SFRJ, which was adopted by the State





























Characteristics and Purpose of the Reorganization of Armed Forces (OS) (Comprising the
Yugoslav People’s Army - JNA and Territorial Defense - TO) 
Although the reorganization of the armed forces took place
during 1987, its beginnings and trial implementation took place
between the years 1981 (the Kosovo events) and 1985, when the
decision on the reorganization of the SFRJ Armed Forces was
made. During this 5-year period, the functioning of the Corps
structure, in this case the 52nd Corps formed in 1981, was sys-
tematically tested within the territory of Kosovo. The principal mis-
sion of this unit was area pacification. The conclusion reached
about  this “laboratory test was that:  if the pacification mission
proved successful in a territory with a 90% non-Serbian pop-
ulation, then there was no reason whatsoever why it should
fail in places where circumstances were much more favorable
(Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina).
This successful test was followed by the abandonment of the
previous military structure which corresponded to the territories of
the Republics, the only exception being Croatia, which was split
between the 5th and the 7th Armies. It should be noted that such a
division of the military, including the Territorial Defense,10 adhered
to the “republic” principle (Figure 1). At the strategic and opera-
tional levels, the organization of the JNA for the most part respect-
Figure 1
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ed the borders of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. Thus,
every Republic had “its own” Army, and every Autonomous
Province had “its own” respective Corps. The commanders of the
armies, i.e. corps, were usually nationals of the respective
Republic.11 That practice had to be discontinued. Therefore, as
early as 1981 the plan was conceived, drawn up in 1985, and
subsequently implemented by reorganizing the chain of command
and establishment of OS SFRJ (the JNA and TO). Veljko Kadijeviæ
would remark that the essence of this resolution was that there
were now three military regions in place of six armies (Fig 2.) Their
territorial division completely ignored the “administrative12” bor-
ders of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces (the Territorial
Defense HQs of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces were
operationally under the direct chain of command of the regional
armies’ HQs instead of the “Supreme Command”13 and regional
headquarters of Territorial Defense were under command of the
JNA corps.). Since the General did not want to delve into the
details of other strategic and operational considerations which
influenced such a decision, the following question should be
asked: What was the hidden agenda? The hidden agenda was as
follows: (1) operational development of readily available forces






























(2) ensuring that those officers who displayed an open commit-
ment to the idea of a Greater Serbia were in positions of author-
ity; and (3) training units in line with the deployment strategies
envisaged by the new “battle in space” doctrine.
According to Kadijeviæ, those new organizational solutions, at
least to a certain extent, impaired the well-established control by
the Republics and Autonomous Provinces over “their” respective
Territorial Defense forces and, for the most part diminished “their”
already legalized influence over the JNA. However controversial
this statement may have been, it proves the extent of the political
independence of the military establishment and the length to
which it would go to destroy the fundamental principle of the JNA
as the armed forces of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities.14
That was the beginning of its planned transformation into the
Serbian imperial armed forces, long before the dissolution of
Yugoslavia occurred. 
Since the political agenda determined that the western border
of a “Greater Serbia” would be drawn along the line connecting
Virovitica, Karlovac and Karlobag, the new military territories were
devised in line with this concept.
1. VO + 3. VO + 1/3 3. VO + 2/3 VPO = a Greater Serbia (1)
This pseudo-mathematical equation translates into a strategy
to appropriate the Danube from Croatia and two-thirds of the
Adriatic.
Strategy of Territorial Defense (ONO) and Self-Protection (DSZ) of SFRJ - Military and
Political Foundation for the Realization Of Greater-Serbian Political Goals
Unlike the 1983 “armed conflict strategy”15 (which was not
formally invalidated by the new strategy), the strategy of ONO
and DSZ was devised as a general military approach to dealing
with defense issues.
Its very title, particularly the section referring to the self-pro-
tection of the people by the people, makes clear that it was a
military and political platform which not only elaborated all
the variations by which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
SFRJ could be “jeopardized,“ but emphasized any form of desta-
bilization of the prevailing social and political structure and eco-
nomic system. According to that strategy, the JNA, in its capacity
as an armed force for the protection of territorial integrity, was
transformed into a military for the protection of the oligarchic
socialist (communist) system. Very significant in this respect was
Chapter 4, entitled “extraordinary circumstances,” which ana-
lyzed the possibility of the SFRJ’s social system being destabilized
and how to prevent this from occurring. The definition of “extraor-


























cumstances which arise in a smaller or larger area (bolded
by author) or in the entire territory of Yugoslavia when an internal
enemy, independently or jointly with external enemy forces, using
the contradictions of social development, objective difficulties,
subjective weaknesses and international circumstances, increases
its subversive activities within the framework of special war or
plans to undertake extensive armed and other types of activities by
which it would directly threaten the country’s independence, its
sovereignty, territorial integrity and its social organization as
established by the Constitution of SFRJ.
According to this definition, the employment of the JNA forces
could be effectuated in two ways:
(1) Demonstrate force and threaten its use in the foci of hostile
activities;
(2) Direct participation of parts of the JNA in the elimination of
“extraordinary circumstances” and their direct conse-
quences.16
There would subsequently be a number of discussions and
"expert" opinions regarding the extraordinary circumstances, par-
ticularly in the JNA G.S. Bulletin. A textbook would be commis-
sioned for the Military Academy curriculum. General Blagoje
Ad iæ enumerated the tasks, the purpose of which was to prepare
the Armed Forces for any such conditions, all within the legal
framework on the use of the Armed Forces of the SFRJ. Those
tasks were "education and training, particularly of the units
engaged in the elimination of extraordinary circumstances,
according to the plans for extraordinary circumstances. "
What can be concluded from such a “military strategy” which
is in fact no strategy at all? First, that the military, rather than the
police, which would make much more sense, would be called
upon to intervene in any such extraordinary situation. Second, if
such an extraordinary situation did not arise, then the strategy
would have lost its meaning. In order to render the strategy mean-
ingful, an extraordinary situation had to be made up, instigated,
created, fuelled and subsequently, the military had to be
employed in reaction to such a “deterministic chaos, based
upon a meticulously elaborated plan which relied on well-trained,
tested and prepared forces. Therefore, already between 1986-
1987, there was a well-disposed, fully “Serbianized” structure of
commissioned officers, the action strategy was well in place, and
the military forces favorably restructured. Those factors would
have steered the already transformed JNA toward the Greater
Serbian nationalist idea even before Miloševiæ entered the politi-
cal scene as the direct executor of that idea. The change of bor-
ders, even internal ones within the federal structure, was not pos-
sible without the use of military force. Realization of this objective





























and when it had adopted a clear ideological and political orien-
tation (the SANU Memorandum). How did it unfold?
War Plans and Preparations for the Attainment of the Greater
Serbian Political Goal
A top-secret war plan existed that envisaged two variants of
“aggression” against Yugoslavia. Those were the East and West
variants, under the code names S-1 and S-2. After 1985 (i.e. the
year when the decision on the restructuring of the armed forces
had been made) the East variant (S-1) was no longer considered
an option and the focus was placed on the West variant. From a
strategic point of view, this implied an entirely different combat-
ready deployment of formations, and also, special attention had
to be paid to the deployment of strategic reserves and the con-
struction of new infrastructure facilities.
Military strategy played a crucial role in the realization of the





At the beginning of the 1980s, conventional weapons
became much more lethal as a direct result of the third techno-
logical revolution, a lethality which resulted from their substantial-
ly greater targeting distance and accuracy. Analysts referred to
them as “intelligent weapons”. In addition to these, there were
also more advanced intelligence gathering instruments (satellites,
planes, unmanned aircraft, electronic and optical-electronic
reconnaissance instruments etc.), and computer-assisted analyses
of data enabled control in real time. This led to the concept of an
integrated and extended battlefield, where information became
the key to the solution and where combat armament was used
sparsely, to the extent required to destroy a target with a given
probability of not less than 95%. The echo effect of any such mil-
itary action was reinforced by political and diplomatic means as
well as through the media. Serbian military circles (the JNA GS)
unable or not wanting to fathom the essence of the new phenom-
ena of war doctrine, developed the notion of “distance blast.”
Such a “blast” was impossible to oppose, as there was no way to
overcome the distance. Such an approach was used to draw up a
war plan based upon circumstances of total aggression by NATO
forces against Yugoslavia.18 The totality was needed to provide the
rationale for a secret operational development of the restructured
JNA forces over the entire territory of Yugoslavia. However, that
was not done in order to resist the NATO forces, but was to be
used according to the well-elaborated plan for area pacification116
(the Kosovo model) in order to create a Greater Serbia.  So that
the restructured JNA forces could develop operationally, a new
concept “battle in space 19 was implemented.  The battle and the
space, as understood by the author, actually meant connecting
the resistance points (read Serbian enclaves) by roads controlled
by maneuver troops (read the JNA) in order to occupy a particu-
lar territory.
Organizational Fundamentals
The already mentioned reorganization of the JNA was the
organizational foundation which was built, tested and adapted
over a period of five years. New infrastructure, primarily barracks
to garrison the mobile, permanently ready forces, were required
to carry out the operational development of the newly reorganized
forces. In addition to those already in existence, new facilities were
built either in suburbs or at city entrances, in major hubs which
formed the connecting tissue between cities and Serbian
“enclaves” deep in the territory of Croatia (Bosnia-Herzegovina).
The sheer number of  cities involved - Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci,
Bjelovar, Petrinja, Karlovac, Gospiæ, Zadar, Šibenik and Split –
indicates clearly what was to be the purpose of those facilities: to
exert control over main roads, to project the military power into
the urban centers and to create a funnel through which the Serb
rebel force would flow directly to the western border of a Greater
Serbia.
Trial Fundamentals
War Plan S-2, the western variant of radical aggression
against Yugoslavia, was systematically tested by the annual train-
ing plan for both the command and units. The highest form of
command education, according to the JNA methodology, was the
“Command and Staff War Game” (CSWG). The Joint Chiefs of
Staff worked out the basic idea for those maneuvers and funda-
mental tasks for different formations - military regions, Navy and
Air Force, and by “pure coincidence”, the name of the maneuvers
was the name of a mountain near Sarajevo, “Romanija” - 86,
87, 88, 89, 90.
An analysis of the Command and Staff War Game, carried
out by the Navy, will best illustrate how the JNA prepared and
trained the command and units for future aggression against
Croatia.20
The fundamental premise was that the overall aggression in
the Adriatic Sea naval theater would be carried out by armed
forces of the USA, Italy, and the United Kingdom, from the Italian
operational base, and using the territory of Albania, with the par-
ticipation of parts of its military (9th Corps). In the northwest
(Slovenia, Croatia), Italian forces would be seconded by German117
and Austrian (a neutral state) operational groups. During the sec-
ond phase, they would be joined by Hungarian forces (a member
of the Warsaw Pact). The assault on the southeastern Yugoslavian
territory would be carried out via Macedonia by the USA and
Greece, to be joined subsequently by Bulgarian (a Warsaw Pact
member) forces.
During the mid 1980s, such a combination of forces was
impossible, not only due to their different bloc affiliation, but also
because it would have been impossible to reconcile their respec-
tive national goals and to create a willingness to jointly embark on
a mission to destroy a country by military action solely in order to
change its social system, as was stated among the reasons for
aggression against Yugoslavia. In other words, it would have been
an action conducted on sheer whim. The absurdity of this strate-
gic assumption is best illustrated by Kadijeviæ’s remarks. He
claimed that the USA would formally hand Yugoslavia over to the
European Community, which Germany would take advantage of
in all possible spheres - political, economic and military - in order
to totally conquer the Balkans in a direct German expansion and
gain access to the Adriatic Sea as the crucial intercontinental hub.
This implied the dissolution of Yugoslavia into small states. It also
implied that not only was there no chance of any form of reduced
Yugoslavia, but also that the creation of a unified Serbian state
embracing the entire Serbian population from the territory of
Yugoslavia would not be permitted.21 The thesis that the USA, as
a major superpower, would hand the ball over in such a sensitive
area to the European Community only to give Germany an
opportunity for economic but also for territorial expansion is
extremely far-fetched. The final outcome of this equation was
allegedly to prevent the formation of a Greater Serbia (a unified
Serbian state). To make the equation workable, an inversion was
necessary:  in order to form a unified Serbian state, a pretext
had to be found in a possible threat coming from the coalition
forces , which could not, and could never have had, such a
political goal. Their goal was to preserve, rather than destroy,
Yugoslavia.
The fundamental military-strategic idea for the forceful appro-
priation of two-thirds of the Adriatic dates back to the 1970s.22
According to the plan, the Croatian coastal area had to be iso-
lated as much as possible from the offshore islands. An imaginary
line beginning in Istria, continuing to Lošinj, Molat, Dugi otok,
irje, Drvenik, Vis, Lastovo, Korèula, and then down to Mljet had
to be marked by military infrastructure and connected with the
respective line in the hinterland which stretched from Benkovac via
Knin down to Trebinje. It took operationally developed and well-
trained forces to connect the two. The task was to break into the


























coastal area and cutting it off from the northern part of Croatia
along the line from Karlobag to Karlovac.
How was this provided for by the postulates of the CSWG?
First, the NATO operational forces were incorporated in the
“Jadran” Operative Group. This Operative Group was comprised
of the following: (1) complete Italian Armed Forces; (2) two
MEBs23, two naval assault groups, two aircraft carrier groups,
101st and 82nd Airborne divisions from the United States; and (3)
one airborne assault landing brigade and a marine expeditionary
unit from the United Kingdom, and Albanian 9th Corps. Airborne
support and isolation of the military region was to be performed
by the 5th ATAF, i.e. the total NATO air-force operating on the
Southern European front (the original idea of the “Romania”
CSWG).
The forces incorporated into the “Jadran” operational group
were classified into TG (tactical group) “Trieste”, TG “Ancona”,
10th Albanian Corps, Marine Landing Unit of the United Kingdom,
the US airborne forces, the marine landing unit of the United
Kingdom and four naval battle groups. Although it was empha-
sized that the coalition forces would apply the principles of air-
land battle and deep penetration in the execution of the operation
order, these principles were not applied in the simulation. The
emphasis on the classical 2-D warfare, and the especially overem-
phasized role of the army, was not only due to a 5:1 ratio in favor
of the sea, but to the hidden intentions of the JNA to realize the
Greater Serbian idea. The projection of power was primarily
aimed at depriving Croatia of its water surfaces. The equation (1)
was thus extended and read: 
1 + 3 + 1/3 (5) + 2/3 (VPO) = a Greater Serbia (2)
The implementation of the plan dating from the 70s, and its
final operationalization during the 80s, illustrated the fact that the
forceful appropriation of two-thirds of the Adriatic was strategi-
cally the most important point, i.e. it was the domino which had
to fall first. Eastern and a part of Central Croatia would follow, as
would Bosnia, which would “fall silently.”
Summarized Plan of “Aggressors’” (NATO) Activities
Since Maslenica-Velebit and Slano-Ston were two key points
(in Figure 2 marked “K”), the structure and the utilization of the
“Jadran” Operational Group had to be adapted accordingly. How
was this conceived? First, on day “D” (the beginning of the
“aggression”) until D+2, sea and parachute landing operations
were undertaken on Lošinj, Molat Isles, Vis, Lastovo, Mljet and in
the region around Slano. During the second stage of the first part
of the operation, when control over all islands and the broader





























tion was introduced, landing was performed in Ravni Kotari, the
10th Corps was transported by sea into the widened bridge-head
near Slano, and force penetration inland continued toward (1)
Ravni Kotari-Sinj-Livno-Kupres, (2) Slano-Mostar-the Neretva
Valley–Sarajevo. 
The Activities of the “Reds” (The JNA)
The plan: Prevent (slow down) penetration into the Ravni
Kotari and Slano regions, and then engage the 9th Corps (Knin
Corps), parts of the 7th K (Sarajevo Corps) and the 9th Boka Naval
Region, counterattack toward Knin-Benkovac-Ravni Kotari-Zadar,
Mostar-Èaplina-Slano and Trebinje-Konavli-Dubrovnik, liberate
the area and assume the defense24. What counterattacking and
assuming the defense in these two  directions meant was illustrat-
ed by the events of 1991. If the idea of the “Jadran” Operational
Group Maneuver, as an integral part of the “Romanija” CSWG, is
compared with the actual situation in 1991, (Figure 3), any further
explanation is unnecessary. It is more than clear to the reader.
This strategic plan (dating from 1986 on) is implemented
each year on day D (the beginning of the attack), over D+7,
D+15, D+35 to D+101, when the NATO forces break onto the
Una-Virovitica line. This “occupied” western part of former
Figure 3
120
Yugoslavia is then “liberated” by strategic assault operations,
using forces from the rear, i.e. from Serbia.25 The well-prepared
and systematic plan, which had a theoretical, organizational and
experimental basis, could not be applied in the classical manner
of a coup d etat, due to prevailing internal and external circum-
stances. The other possibility would be an open attack on Croatia,
in which case the JNA and Serbia would have been considered
aggressors,26 and the repercussions upon the two would have
been much more significant than if they were shown to be the
“defenders”. The essence of the entire plan was to create an
aggressor which would transform the JNA into  the defender.
Therefore, the JNA, as a tool of Serbia’s hegemonistic inten-
tions, did not act directly. They applied a wearing-down strategy,
a conflict of low rather than medium intensity, which was intend-
ed to reinforce the impression that it was a spontaneous resistance
by the “unarmed  Serbian people” who were defending their lives
and “centuries-old hearths and homes”, and that the JNA was
present only for their protection. Actually, the fundamental char-
acteristic of such a strategy was its vagueness, with the military
armed forces being used in small increments, between meetings,
sessions, agreements, negotiations and diplomatic notes. It all
appeared aimless, and still the objective was well defined, accord-
ing to a well-elaborated and tested plan: the gradual occupation
of the largest possible portion of Croatian territory.  This particu-
lar use of the military could be appropriately referred to as a
“crawling strategy”.
Strategy is not a doctrine (science) but a way of thinking, even
if abstract, which enables the alignment and arrangement of the
sequence of events. Within the crawling strategy, the most impor-
tant goal during the first stage of the war was to transform Croatia
from a defender into an aggressor. A trap had to be set to achieve
that goal, and Croatia was expected to fall into the trap without
thinking twice. The trap was the attack on garrisons,27 or more
accurately, the attack against the JNA.28
The Application of Strategy in Aggression Against Croatia
Between  March 12 - 15, 1991, “the Joint Chiefs of Staff”,
i.e. the Greater-Serbian military establishment, asked the
Presidency of SFRJ to proclaim a state of emergency29 throughout
Yugoslavia and to deploy the JNA.  When this was denied, the
JNA decided on the implementation of the contingency plan,
which was the emergency plan “on the protection of the Serbian
people and assisting them in their defense,” mentioned by
General Blagoje Ad iæ.
The strategy was implemented in two steps. The first step
implied the conquering of key points: Karlovac, Zadar, Dubrovnik,




























attacks on the main roads by combining infantry and tank
assaults, assisted by mortar fire, to destroy civilian objects and
infrastructure along the entire territory of Croatia.  The Navy was
to implement a naval blockade, and the Air Force an air block-
ade.
The goal, the idea and the plan of the JNA departed from the
reformed role of the JNA with regard to its role as established by
the Constitution of the SFRJ. During this stage of armed conflict
(read aggression), the JNA “protected” Serbs in Croatia from the
attacks by “Croatian armed formations,” and at the same time
enabled them to organize themselves for “defense”, but in actual-
ity for attack. The JNA was prepared for a war against Croatia as
soon as Croatia launched the “war against the JNA.” The mis-
sion was to be carried out within the framework of “preventing
conflicts among the nations” as was put forth by the Presidency
of SFRJ in its decree. The G. S. would reinforce the JNA forma-
tions in Croatia and around Croatia in order to implement the set
mission. A number of armored mechanized formations, ranging
from company to division, would be placed as close as feasible to
the possible venues of conflict so that they would be able to inter-
vene at very short notice. An adequate number of armored mech-
anized brigades would be deployed on the axis points (gravity
centers) in and around Croatia so they could be used for major
interventions.
Here we can see the strategic postulate of the operational
deployment of units which the JNA G. S. delineated, and General
Radinoviæ scientifically elaborated in his general’s thesis as a
“battle in space.”
According to the JNA G. S. point of view, the JNA succeeded
in attaining the objectives of the first stage of the war: it “protect-
ed” the Serbian population, it helped them and enabled them to
prepare, in military and political terms, for the events which were
to follow, and, according to Kadijeviæ, that is exactly what the
Serbs did. Croatia failed to gain full control over its whole territo-
ry because of the role played by the JNA. And not only
that. “Croatia realized that this is the goal it would never attain
as long as the JNA was there.”30
During the second stage of the war, as conceived by the over-
all concept on the use of the JNA forces in Croatia “for the
defense of Serbs” in Croatia, the model of “preventing conflicts
among nations” could no longer be applied. There had to be an
“open Croatian attack”, which would be obvious and which
would clearly show who was the attacker and who the defender,
who was imposing the war, and only then strike back.
The basic idea which served for the elaboration of the use of
the JNA between 1986 and 1990 throughout Yugoslav territory


























ation so permitted, but at least to the extent which would
enable the attainment of set goals. For the JNA, those goals were
to attain full collaboration with Serbian rebels and enable the
completion of the retreat of the remainder of the JNA forces from
Slovenia; in doing that, special attention had to be paid to the fact
that the “role of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be
crucial for the future of the entire Serbian nation.” The new dis-
position of the JNA forces had to be adapted accordingly.31
The strategic plan of the occupation of Croatia was covertly
prepared over a number of years. It was tested over a period of
five years, and was announced in 1993 by its implementer,
General Veljko Kadijeviæ, who, before he actually started imple-
menting it, disarmed Croatia by appropriating the arms from its
Territorial Defense. On the eve of the realization and launching of
the plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (G.S.) of the Armed Forces of
SFRJ issued the “Instruction on the use of strategic groups” by
which it would determine how they were to execute operations.32
The actual operationalized plan (strategic operation) read as
follows:33 strategic mission to be carried out in two stages. During
the first stage, primary use of counterattacks of tactical signifi-
cance, in several directions, until Croatia becomes more heavily
involved (attacked barracks), with reinforced organization and
preparation of Serbian rebels; during the second stage, a coor-
dinated strategic attack operation to defeat the Croatian Army
and complete the mission. The goal of the force maneuvers:
(1) Total blockade of Croatia from air and sea;
(2) Connecting attacks by major forces as closely as possible with
the “liberation” of the Serb regions in Croatia and the JNA
garrisons deep within the territory of Croatia. To this end,
intersectng Croatia along the lines of Gradiška-Virovitica,
Bihaæ-Karlovac-Zagreb, Knin-Zadar, Mostar-Split. Use of
most powerful armored units to occupy Eastern Slavonia,
which would thereafter proceed quickly towards the west to
join forces in Western Slavonia, and continue on towards
Zagreb and Vara din, i.e. onto the Slovenian border.34 At the
same time, use of strong force from the region of Herceg Novi
– Trebinje, blockade of Dubrovnik from the mainland, and
introduction of units into the Neretva Valley to join forces
coming from the direction Mostar-Split;
(3) Upon reaching designated objects (decision points), ensure
and hold the “border of Srpska Krajina” in Croatia, pull out
the remaining JNA units from Slovenia and then withdraw the
JNA from Croatia;
(4) Mobilization and preparation of mobilized and supplemented
troops, and their transport to the planned directions of





























level of combat preparedness of the units and their distance
from the direction of deployment.
Based on the Serbian calculations, the main tasks of the trans-
formed operation plan were attained:
(1) One-third of  Croatia, with a predominantly Serb population,
“was liberated;”
(2) “Krajina” formed its own army, which the JNA equipped with
the appropriate weapons and battle technology;
(3) the JNA withdrew its main combat forces from Croatia and
deployed them for future tasks. (Author’s note: Bosnia-
Herzegovina).
These conclusions are realistic, except for the evaluation that
Croatia adopted the Vance Plan because it had lost the war.
Croatia did not lose the war.  On the contrary, Croatia won the
war. Strategy is not merciful. It simply dictates that the winner of a
war is he who prevents the enemy from attaining its set strategic
goal. The set strategic goal for the JNA was to defeat the
Croatian Army and arrive at the Slovenian border.
Neither of the two goals was achieved.
Croatian  Response to the Applied Strategy
Further warfare gives advantage to the side which better uti-
lizes the suspension time. The Croatian strategy proved very suc-
cessful in this regard, as Croatia was able to wait and to deliver
the decisive blow at the right moment (the final operations of the
Croatian Army in 1995).
Stalling has an exceptional meaning in the modern concept of
strategy. If the objective of a strategy is attaining the set political
goals by making the most of the means available, then Croatia
applied a wise and reasonable strategy and applied it to the com-
plexity of the actual situation. Moreover, the adjustment of the
Croatian strategy was influenced by the following elements of the
situation: the Armed Forces of Croatia had grown in numbers,
they had better weapons, and mobilization was carried out
smoothly. By stalling and buying time, the Croatian leadership
knew that the JNA would eventually disintegrate not only on eth-
nic, but on other levels as well. Croatia reacted to this “crawling
strategy” with a “strategy of indirect approach.” Politics and
diplomacy, and later economy, played a prevailing role here, so
as to enable Croatia to resist blows delivered during the first stage
of the war. As already stated, these elements were important for
buying time, in order to create a well equipped and trained mili-
tary which would be capable of winning battles (assault opera-
tions, from tactical to strategic level). At this point, one should


























that there is a strategy for every particular situation.  A certain
strategy may be the best for one combination of circumstances,
and absolutely useless for another.
There has been a lot of discussion as to the right timing for
the attack against the military garrisons. Under the given circum-
stances (the beginning of the war), that operation fell into the cat-
egory of strategy. A war is either won or lost at the level of strate-
gy, and not at the level of tactics. One can lose many battles and
still win the war. For a strategic move, such as the attack on bar-
racks, timing is of the utmost importance;  when to launch the
action is crucial.  The subsequent events confirmed that the timing
was well chosen and that a trap was thereby avoided. Kadijeviæ
himself said that the attack on the garrisons was a trap, and that
it would have been much better for the JNA if the attack had been
launched earlier, since time was not on the JNA’s side.35 By not
falling into the trap which had been laid, Croatia was better pre-
pared for the second stage of the war, from which it emerged vic-
torious.
Simulated War
Finally, the military option of the Greater Serbian scheme
(which has been outlined in this paper) cannot be fully compre-
hended without an analysis of the war in Slovenia and without
addressing the strategic concept of “praxeology - the study of
human conduct.” Here, the most important principle is contained
in this phrase: “It is not important what is, what can be seen, but,
rather, what cannot be seen and what is aspired to.”
According to the JNA, the Slovenes treated them as though
they were an occupation army. The JNA, however, could not and
had no desire to treat the Slovenes in the manner of an occupa-
tion army. Herein lies the answer to a never completely clarified
issue: What was the real intention of the JNA during the so-called
Slovenian War? The war has since been referred to by many dif-
ferent names. For the Slovenes, it is most certainly the greatest war
they have ever waged and therefore it is for them a source of
national pride.  As far as the war’s impact on Croatia, it can be
referred to conditionally as a “simulated war”. The hidden agen-
da was to involve Croatia. There is ample basis for this claim, as
corroborated by the three possible options for the use of the JNA
forces in the event of such a scenario. The first option was to
defeat the Slovenian combat formations and then abandon
Slovenia. The second was to use all the available Air Force units
to inflict damage on the Slovenian infrastructure and thus force it
to comply with the decisions of the federal institutions. The third,
which was subsequently adopted, was to attain political goals by
the combined use of political means and military threat (JNA). In





























the reactions of the Slovenian side. The controversy and absurdi-
ty of the first two options lie not only in the fact that they both pro-
posed a terrorist use of the military force, but also in their objec-
tives: to wage war (paying a high price) and then withdraw. There
would be no support for strategic goals of this nature. Only an
unbalanced military mind could promote such an adventure.
The third option was the most realistic, not only because it
represented the lowest cost for the JNA, but also because it was
instrumental in carrying out the hidden agenda, which was to
involve an unprepared Croatia in the war. On July 18, 1991, a
decision was passed that the JNA formations were to be moved
from Slovenia. The move was arranged by “the Supreme
Command” in such a way that it served as a preparation for
aggression against Croatia. Kadijeviæ would write that “this was
the opportunity we had counted on and we had a response
ready and waiting.” The response was a strategic operation
intended to lead to the attainment of all the goals the JNA had set
for Croatia, and which are outlined in this paper.
Conclusion
The JNA belonged to an ideological, all-embracing type of
military organization, which served as the overseer of state and
society, and devalued individual abilities. Military officers repre-
sentated the embodiment of conviction, identification with officers
(charisma) and politicization.
Thus, the JNA could easily be transformed into a Serbian mil-
itary force in both of its components. Ideologically, this was
accomplished when the JNA adopted the Greater Serbian idea
or the “creation of a unified Serbian state, which would
embrace the entire Serbian nation within the territory of
Yugoslavia.” In broader terms, the transformation was carried out
in the areas of language, officer corps, reorganization and the use
of strategic groups, all based upon the strategic postulate of a
“nation in arms” – but only the Serbian nation. The long and sys-
tematic process of transforming the JNA into a Serbian imperial
force was achieved by a sequence of events: (1) a very sophisti-
cated staffing policy was applied to transform the military into a
Serbian and not a people’s military; (2) military  infrastructure was
adapted to suit deployment and use as foreseen in the plan to
breaking onto the Western Serbian border; (3) military forces were
adapted to suit the tactical needs of area pacification and this was
tested under “laboratory conditions” even before the Serbian
political goals were publicly announced; (4) the operational use
of the military forces was tested for functioning under conditions
of “extraordinary events” and the entire exercise was camouflaged
using the cover of a possible total aggression by the NATO forces


























of the plan, the Yugoslav option was stressed and clearly dis-
played to the world and then the “international enemy - destroy-
er” was awaited, so that when he made a move and launched the
first attack, he could be defeated; (6) under war conditions, dur-
ing the final stage of the process, the JNA was finally transformed
into a number of Serbian armies, and the main concern was to
protect the “threatened” Serbian people.
These reflections on the implementation of the Serbian
aggression and the forms it assumed represent an attempt to
understand the time and events and hence to eliminate any
doubts as to when and how the JNA became an instrument of the
Greater Serbian idea. This can best be seen in the words of its cre-
ators: “The JNA represents the foundation from which three
Serbian armies were created. This was done in response to given
internal and international circumstances and in a very structured
manner,” (V. Kadijeviæ, 1993).
If the purpose of a strategy is to attain political goals by the
best utilization of available means, if it is a “compilation” of infor-
mation enriched by every subsequent generation, if it is not just a
repetition of what has been learned, independent of coincidental
experience, then it should not have come as a surprise that
Croatia found a way to meet the challenge, and to successfully
oppose Greater Serbian plans as well as the role which the JNA
had assumed in such plans.
Aggression Against Bosnia-Herzegovina
At the overall involvement level, the role of the JNA in the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the same as in Croatia. Likewise, the
idea of occupation was part and parcel of the whole plan. This
paper puts forth not only the fundamental idea which developed
on the grounds of the S-2 war plan (the total “aggression” of
NATO against former Yugoslavia), but also its modifications and
the reorganization (adaptation) of the JNA in order to create “new
Serbian armies”.
In this overview, the author also proposes an explanation as
to when and where the JNA, as the Serbian military, reached its
strategic peak. The appearance of this term recently in analytical
reviews, especially in the western world, implies that the war upon
the territory of former Yugoslavia is no longer being regarded
based upon individual military operations and their conse-
quences, the strength and capabilities of the armies, the number
of casualties, the level and value of destroyed infrastructure and
facilities, but rather at the level of strategic considerations which
attempt to determine a “place” for every state.
An analysis of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina




























derived from the set goals of the aggression, from the means and
especially the manner in which the means were applied. In such
strategic analytical reviews, the point of departure should always
be that the JNA armed forces acted as the instrument of aggres-
sion. The intention of this review is to illustrate the role of the JNA
in the Bosnia-Herzegovina War.
Introductory Remarks
During the war in Croatia, the JNA failed to attain its set
strategic goal, which was to defeat the Croatian Army and
move towards the Slovenian border, hence, in keeping with the
Memorandum ideas, to extend the “the western borders of
Serbia” and construct it along the line from Virovitica via
Karlovac down to Karlobag.  It was therefore necessary and draw
Bosnia-Herzegovina into the strategic game. Bosnia-Herzegovina
was essential for the realization of the idea of Greater Serbia.
Kadijeviæ had stated that the basic criterion was the survival of the
Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to him, the
Serbian people, by their geographical location and number, were
the cornerstone for the constitution of a common state of the
entire Serbian nation, either in some new Yugoslavia, or in an
exclusively Serb state. He went on to say that “without
Yugoslavia, there will be no state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Therefore, everybody has to be firmly and unconditionally
supportive of Yugoslavia, irrespective of personal inclina-
tions.”36
Such an a priori claim leads to an obvious question: What
was the role of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Unlike the war in
Croatia, which occupied a significant position in Kadijeviæ’s book
and was afforded an analytical review, the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was totally ignored, covered in approximately two
pages37 and was given no analytical review.
Theoretical, Organizational and Trial Foundations of the
Aggression Plan
Comprehensiveness of the Strategic Plan
It is understandable that, at the level of comprehensiveness,
the role of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina was equivalent to its
role in Croatia, since it was derived from the same strategic idea
of the creation of a “Greater Serbia”. The comprehensiveness
implies a long-lasting and systematic transformation of the JNA
into a Serbian imperial force, per a structural, organizational,
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operational and implementation plan based upon a unified idea
which is temporarily adjusted to the prevailing internal and exter-
nal circumstances, but always under the catch phrase of “pro-
tecting the Serbian people and assisting them to defend
themselves” and “preventing conflicts among nationalities. 38
The operational plan for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
also based upon the premise of a radical Western “aggression”
against Yugoslavia (war plan S-2), and it contained the same
structural elements: theoretical, organizational and trial ele-
ments.39 The theoretical and organizational elements were the
same as for the war in Croatia, but the trial elements continued
and expanded to include the areas of Southwest, South and
Central Bosnia.
The Summarized Plan of Action of the “Blue” - NATO Aggressor in the Territory
of Bosnia-Herzegovina
The plan of action of NATO forces in a scenario of total
aggression against Yugoslavia was comprised of the following
sequence of events upon the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina:
After airborne and amphibious landing operations on Adriatic
islands (D-D+2), the operative forces of NATO join up with the
“Jadran” operational group on D+6, hit the beach in Ravni
Kotari, that is, Slano. After that, the landing groups were to be
129 Figure 4
joined on D+15 by TG “ANCONA” and the 10th Army Corps
(AC). Together they were to continue penetrating deep into
Bosnia-Herzegovian territory (Figure 4).
Forces of the 10th AK would advance along the Neretva val-
ley towards Sarajevo until joining forces with 101st Airborne
Division (US Army Forces), which on D+17 would land on Ravna
Romanija (to the West of Pale). Skirting Knin, the TG “ANCONA”
troops would move on towards Sinj, Livno, Kupres and Bugojno,
approaching Sarajevo from the west and acting on the left wing
together with the 10th AC forces. To speed up the rate of attack,
tactical landing operations were to be undertaken at Vaganj Pass
(Kamešnica) and Ar ano. 
Actions of the “Red” (JNA)
This then was the “aggressor’s” plan. The “Red” (JNA) could
react in one way only: by forming three groups (Figure 5) to
achieve the following goal:
1. First operational group (OG Mostar)40, acting in the region of
Mostar and Eastern Herzegovina, was tasked to prevent pen-
etration along the Neretva Valley and stop “Blue” south of
Mostar. This was the fall-back position. After that, they would130
Figure 5
begin a counter-attack, move on to the coast and organize
their defensive positions there;
2. The mission of the second operational group (OG Kupres),
located in the region of the Kupres Plateau and Western
Bosnia, was to launch lateral blasts against the forces of TG
Ancona in the direction of the Livno and Sinj Plateau, and
extend their actions further down towards Split, acting jointly
with the forces which were engaged in counter-attack opera-
tions in Neretva Valley;
3. Third group (OG  Sarajevo), acting along the semi-circular axis
of Central and Eastern Bosnia, were to perform rectifying cir-
cular blasts against landing operations over Romanija, and to
“remove the blockade” from Sarajevo, which was to be
defended by circular defense.
The operational deployment of “Red” forces, as in the aggres-
sion against Croatia, was systematically tested by the annual train-
ing plan, as formulated in the “Romanija” Command and Staff
War Game.
The postulates of the direction of attacks of the “aggressor”
and the operational deployment of the “defender-red,” show
clearly that at a strategic level, the JNA Joint Chiefs of Staff, deter-
mined that the following constituted the critical points of pacifica-
tion (read occupation) of Bosnia-Herzegovina: (1) south-west-
ern part, i.e. Herzegovina; and (2) Sarajevo - the capital.
The successful defense of the south-western part of Bosnia-
Herzegovina would save not only Bosnia-Herzegovina, but all of
southern Croatia as well.
The Implementation of Strategy in the Aggression Against Bosnia-
Herzegovina
The desirable goal was for Bosnia to “fall silently”. However,
when the JNA efforts (threats and selective use of military force)
did not yield the desired results, especially with the Croatian peo-
ple, who managed to organize their army, the JNA shifted to the
concrete realization of the pacification of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
adopting the model used in Croatia. The only difference here,
however, was the fact that the vacillation of the Moslems in the
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina reinforced the impression
within the JNA that the war would be over quickly.
It should be noted that the general plan regarding the cre-
ation of  “Greater Serbia” and a move onto the western
Serbian border was not changed; rather, it was adapted to suit
the prevailing political and military situation. The major element
of this adaptation was devising the means for maintaining control




























tional forces - while Bosnia-Herzegovina was being occupied.
Then, once it was occupied, a plan for annexing nearly one third
of the occupied territory of Croatia and attaining the set goal of
creating a Greater Serbia was needed.  Such a “Greater Serbia”
would have failed in establishing its western borders along the
Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica line, but the border would still not
have been far away and it would have followed the line
Starigrad Paklenica-Karlovac-Pakrac-Nova
Gradiška-Sava River-Osijek.
Reaching a Strategic Peak
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out after the first stage
of the war in Croatia.  In regard to the war in Croatia, i.e. the first
stage in that war, there are various “doubts”, and even some
understated hypotheses, as to who was the winner and who was
the loser, whether or not the ceasefire agreement should have
been signed, whether international forces (UNPROFOR) should
have been allowed in, whether and what type of internationaliza-
tion of the conflict should have taken place.
Interestingly enough, a theory has recently appeared which
attempts to “prove” that Serbia reached its strategic peak towards
the end of 1991,41 with the occupation of Vukovar. Such a hypoth-
esis serves as “proof” that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina could
have been avoided and that, ultimately, the military actions Flash
and Storm would not have been necessary at all.42
What answer could a strategic evaluation provide to such a
hypothesis? There are no doubt strategic peaks in every war.
However, doubts arise as to exactly when they are attained.
Strategy teaches us that during a war the aggressor finds it very
difficult to determine its strategic peaks, which would then tell
them when to stop.43The defenders’ task is even more difficult,
since they require time to regroup, train and equip their armed
forces in order to move from strategic defense to strategic
attack. This is especially true of emerging armed forces, as was
the Croatian Army. In the case of Croatia, this valuable time had
to be gained, since the enemy would have never granted it freely.
The combat power, i.e. the projection of military force, does
not consist just in the number of people armed with patriotism and
combat morale, which Croatia undoubtedly had at the time. It is
rather a combination of equipment, training, operational mobility
and development, the ability of operational control, and response
to sudden and unpredictable (unexpected) enemy actions: in
short, in the persuasiveness of the military force. When it comes to
assault operations, even at the lowest tactical level, not to men-
tion the strategic level, there is always the question of what would
be the price to pay, especially in manpower. The worst strategy is132
one which pays the price in human lives, especially when the
resource is very scarce, such as in the case of Croatia (with a pop-
ulation of 4,700,000 people).
Having won the first stage of the war44, Croatia needed a
pause for two reasons. The first was to avoid further destruction
and to regroup the Army, which implied that numbers had to be
replaced by quality, and to increase the mobility of the forces and
develop the possibility of transferring the decision points as a
condicio sine qua non for a successful assault operation.  The
second was that it was irrational and impossible to wage wars on
two separate fronts when the main operational roads (Zagreb-
Karlovac-Rijeka; Zagreb-Karlovac-Zadar-Split-Dubrovnik; and
Zagreb-Nova Gradiška-Vinkovci-Osijek) were under constant
threat.
The important fact is that the beginning of the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was determined exclusively by Serbian political and
military leaders according to a well elaborated plan. Having
attained a reduced strategic goal (the occupation of nearly one
third of Croatia, but failing to break onto the Western Serbian bor-
der), the JNA and Serbia realized that continuing meant a further
waste of troops, and therefore became irrational, due to losses,
the upswing of operations, and the internationalization of the con-
flict. The JNA and Serbia had been clearly marked as aggressors.
Therefore, this was not about the strategic peak having been
attained. The military force was thus redirected and projected onto
those territories which, under the given circumstances, would yield
the best results. At that moment, the thinking of the JNA and
Serbia was as follows: if they managed to resolve the issue of
Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible, they would be able to
again concentrate on Croatia, under different, extremely favor-
able conditions.
But there remains an open-ended question: When would the
JNA and Serbia, and even more importantly, where (underlined by
the author) would they reach their strategic peak? The geo-strate-
gic position of Croatia, but also the Greater Serbia objective,
clearly indicated that this peak could only be reached in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in its western part. Strategic peaks are not deter-
mined by only one or two factors of a war doctrine, but by all the
factors joined together in a mutual relationship. Space plays a
crucial role, since wars are actually waged to gain control over a
certain area. In addition to time and the strength of the forces, the
peak must also be placed in space.
To corroborate this postulate, the best answer is to look at the
organization and operational development of JNA forces and
Serbian rebels in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which were carried out
during the first stage of the war in Croatia, and ended at the




























Operationalization and Adaptation of Plan During Aggression
Organization and Operational Development of JNA Forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina between January and April 1992
To better understand the strategic relationships within the ter-
ritory of former Yugoslavia in 1992, one must return to previous-
ly mentioned postulates of the “Romanija” CSWG. Three opera-
tional groups of the JNA were in charge of defending the area of
Western Bosnia-Herzegovina from NATO, by implementing the
circular defense of the city of Sarajevo and moving to a counter-
attack, directed towards Mostar and the Neretva Valley, i.e. Livno
and Split. This type of defense and subsequent counter-attack
clearly show, first, the complete overlapping of JNA maneuvers
within CSWG Romanija and the JNA operations for the occupa-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992 (Figure 6) and, second,
that the defense of the lines Kupres-Livno-Split and Mostar-Ploèe
constituted the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also of entire
southern Croatia.
The strategic dilemma for Croatia was whether to launch an
attack operation to liberate the occupied territories with an army
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ill-equipped for such military actions, to pay a very high price and
then possibly fail to achieve the set goal, which would mean a
strategic defeat, or to gain time, regroup the army, preserve the
depth of their operations, not only in Western Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but also in Southern Croatia, and at the same time,
attempt to prevent the Serbs from realizing their transformed goal.
The second option, which was eventually adopted, was
absolutely correct, as subsequent events would show. Why? In
strategy there is one essential principle: the principle of opposi-
tion, which implies that the interest of one side is in opposition to
the interest of the other side. War activities have two forms: assault
and defense, which are very different and unequal in strength. If
one side wishes to postpone an outcome, the other must work for
the outcome to happen as quickly as possible, and vice versa. If
a certain moment is good for one side, but it is too weak and not
ready for an attack, it still will not lose its chance to wage a suc-
cessful defense.  It simply must wait for a more favorable moment
in the future when it is certain to have accumulated a convincing
and measurable military power.45 The supremacy of defense, as
Clausewitz would write, is very substantial, much more substantial
than its face value, and his words are especially revelant during
periods when there is a suspension of war activities, which occurs
often during a war.46 The crucial question in this respect is which
side is going to better utilize the suspension and waiting time in
order to prepare itself for a final attack?
There is another cause for a suspension in the war: incom-
plete understanding of the situation, which is due either to the
overestimation of the enemy or oneself or the underestimation of
the enemy or oneself. Any attempt at a strategic analysis requires
a strict adherence to the principle which argues that the slower a
war activity evolves, and the more frequent and longer the sus-
pensions are, the sooner it will be possible to correct possible fal-
lacies. Strategy does not forgive fallacies. The biggest fallacy dur-
ing a war is to attack at the wrong time. A strategic assault mis-
sion for the liberation of the occupied territories of Croatia in late
1991 and early 1992 would have been an attack at the wrong
time, since the strategic principle of opposition and waiting had
not been satisfied, i.e. the creation of forces which would move
from strategic defense into a strategic attack.
After an explanation of these strategic dilemmas, it might be
instructive to examine how the JNA and the Serbian political lead-






























As Kadijeviæ described it, the cooperation with Serb represen-
tatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian population as a
whole was very good during war preparations, and it enabled the
goal of a new Yugoslavia to be pursued. This was ensured during
the war in Croatia by a timely maneuver and the shift of the JNA
forces across Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was of the utmost
importance for the JNA. It was emphasized often that the maneu-
vers and movements encountered difficulties and were sometimes
even obstructed, but never completely obstructed. This permitted
a successful mobilization in the “Serbian part” of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In addition, it alleviated the burden of mobilization
in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.
This opinion affirms that the JNA, i.e. Serbian forces, were not
exhausted, and also that they had not by any means reached their
strategic peak, and that this second reorganization of the entire
Serbian military forces served a completely different purpose.
The purpose of the well-organized, equipped and armed
Serbian forces in the occupied territories of Croatia was to act as
the frontline task force and carry out defense operations, and the
second, strategically stronger task force was used to occupy
Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus indirectly attain the set Greater
Serbian goal.
It should be noted that the JNA were forced to direct towards
Croatia a portion of the second body of strategic troops. As
Kadijeviæ himself said, it had been their judgement that after one
of the Serbian armies had been formed (“the Serbian Krajina
Army - SVK”), strong JNA forces needed to be deployed in the
occupied territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the
viewpoint of the Serbian military establishment, this would address
every possible political option in the development of events in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the need for having ready-trained
and strong forces on the border with RSK as a guarantee that
Croatia would respect the Vance Plan. In addition to that, the fol-
lowing statement indicates how justified they felt their decision was
to shift the second strategic task force towards the occupied part
of the Republic of Croatia: “The constant aggression of Croatia
against RSK shows how right we were in having done this.”47
In operational terms, Croatia found itself at that moment in a
much more favorable position. Although the JNA forces which
were committed to aggression against its territory still remained
deployed, they were no longer positioned across the entire depth
of its state territory, but outside of it. In this way, the projection of
the military power of these forces on to Croatia had decreased in
strength, and at the same time, the troops could not be used136
across the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In strategy,
such a situation is referred to as a double binding of
forces.
Operational Deployment and Maneuver of JNA Forces for the War in Bosnia-
Herzegovina
At the moment the Vance agreement was signed, forces
equaling 49 brigades (including the blocked formations of the
32nd, 13th and 10th Corps48) were engaged in the aggression
against the Republic of Croatia. There were three armored
brigades, six mechanized, 14 infantry, 18 Territorial Defense
(Partisan) brigades, 12 territorial defense squadrons, various for-
mations of mortar and missile support, air defense, engineer
corps and other special units.
The total strength of forces was: 90-95 thousand soldiers,
850-900 tanks, 700-750 armored personnel carriers, 1,200
artillery pieces of every caliber, including ground-to-ground  rock-
ets R-65 “Luna” and anti-aircraft defense missiles, 24 naval ves-
sels (Vis and Lastovo). A total of 350 aircraft of all types were
engaged in combat. 
The JNA system of management and command adapted to
the different given situations - Slovenia, Croatia and finally
Bosnia-Herzegovina. When the Chiefs-of-Staff of the 5th Military
Region (Zagreb) and the Naval Region (Split) were unable to per-
form their command duties, the tasks were taken over and carried
out by the SFRJ Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had direct command
over parts of the 1st Military Region, i.e. the Novi Sad, Tuzla and
Banja Luka corps, and especially over the temporarily constituted
OG-1 and 2 which were deployed during the aggression against
Croatia.
Such  conditions would prevail until December 1991, when
the JNA embarked on the reorganization of the chain of com-
mand. The major reorganization of the JNA was finished by
December 30, when the Serbian Federal President issued consent
for the dissolution and dismissal of the 5th Military Region and
Naval Region, headquartered respectively in Zagreb and Split.
Having mentioned this development, one must bear in mind the
broader circumstances of the situation, which “forced” the JNA to
act under unfavorable conditions and prepare for the “battle for
the preservation of Yugoslavia”, i.e. for the occupation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. One of the unfavorable aspects of that situation was
the recognition of Croatia as an independent and sovereign state
and the mounting international condemnation of the dirty war
waged by the JNA and Serbia.
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Spatiality and Organization of New Military Regions
The ultimate goal of the JNA’s reorganization was to achieve
a dominant position in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no doubt
that the JNA considered Bosnia-Herzegovina an integral part of
Serbia, i.e. Montenegro. The Eastern part of Bosnia, east of the
river Bosna, was assigned to the 1st Military Region, the southern
part was subordinated to the recently formed 4th Military Region,
and the remainder, predominantly western and central parts of
Bosnia, fell under the authority of the 2nd Military Region.
For the purpose of waging war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
JNA established the 2nd and 4th Military Regions (between
December 1991 and January 1992) with the respective head-
quarters in Sarajevo and Podgorica. In March of the same year,
under the retreat of the JNA from Macedonia, the Headquarters
of the 3rd Military Region was moved from Skopje to Niš. With the
already existing reduced 1st Military Region, the JNA Army forces
were organized into four military regions, as groups at the strate-
gic level. Their staffs were in charge of the preparations, organi-
zation and harmonization of the combat use of JNA in parts of the
territory of former Yugoslavia.
The division - delineation (Figure 7) was comprised as follows:
1st Military Region (Belgrade) - Vojvodina and Northern Serbia to
the line between Kragujevac and U ice, including Kragujevac and
Figure 7138
excluding U ice and the northwestern part of Bosnia-
Herzegovina49; 3rd Military Region (Niš) southern part of Serbia
and Kosovo50; 2nd Military Region (Sarajevo), western, northern
and central parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the line connecting
Foèa-Kalinovik-Mostar51; and 4th Military Region (Podgorica),
south of that line, Montenegro and south-western part of Serbia.52
The military regions preserved the former structure, which was
based on corps of different power and composition, as the oper-
ational level group, deployed in the directions of planned use.
Moreover, there were 1-2 combined artillery brigades, combined
anti-tank brigade, engineer brigade, security motorized regiment
(for the protection of military region staffs, consisting of a military
police battalion, commando unit and a motorized battalion), sig-
nals regiment, NBC defense regiment and a number of logistics
bases, as special components under the direct chain of command
of military region commanders. The 1st and the 3rd Military Regions
also each had an independent armored or mechanized brigade.
The total power of the JNA (2nd MR, part of the 4th and 1st MR)
deployed at the beginning of 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina was:
83,000 men, 460-500 tanks, 400-420 armored vehicles and
950-1, 000 mortars.
The officer corps of the thus reorganized JNA (the officer
corps) consisted of 92.6% Serbs, 7% Montenegrins and 0.4% oth-
ers.
The system of control and force subordination was such that
the MODs of SAO in the Republic of Croatia and in Bosnia-
Herzegovina were under the direct chain of command of the
Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
“coordinated the execution of defense plans” and whose com-
mon goal was the “protection of external borders and their
incorporation into the system of Yugoslavia.”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were in charge of the operational
command over all the units of “VJ”, “VRS” and “SVK”.
The capabilities of particular corps or their units were less
than optimal. This could be seen from the characteristics of the
combat activities in the war against Croatia, especially during the
first stage of the war against Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were
many indications that the JNA had difficulties in maintaining full
composition structure of the brigades, primarily due to problems
with unit replenishment based upon the required numbers and
qualifications of recruits. As the war continued, this problem esca-
lated. For that reason it became increasingly more common for
the Army to relocate soldiers from different formations, and to use






























The Purpose of Military and Territorial Division
The military and territorial division, as well as the organization
of forces, illustrate the fact that the 2nd and 4th Military Regions, as
the first strategic echelon in the occupation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, were tasked to achieve area pacification, based
upon the already tested Croatian model. They were to connect
Serbian enclaves, cleanse the area of Croats and Bosnian
Muslims, and project their military power onto the southern part
of Croatia, as well as to assist Serbian forces in the occupied ter-
ritories of Croatia. The second strategic echelon, the 1st and 3rd
Military Regions, served as strategic reserves. They were also to
provide some of their troops to reinforce the 2nd and 4th Military
Regions and to be the vehicle to project force onto the eastern
part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
At the moment when the territory of Eastern Bosnia-
Herzegovina fell under the direct chain of command of the 1st
Military Region, Serbia’s territory crossed onto the western bank of
the Drina. Likewise, by extending the authority of the 4th MR over
the south-western part of Serbia, its short operational depth was
extended.
The demarcation line between the military regions showed
clearly that Belgrade wished not only to resolve the issue of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also to indirectly provide for the appro-
priation of the occupied territories from Croatia, since the 2nd and
4th military regions had “natural” access to the sea, with the
demarcation line being drawn form Vrlika to the Dalmatinska
Ploèa Cape (Figure 8).
Realization of the First Stage of the Operational Plan
The JNA already controlled a part of Herzegovina (Ravno,
Popovo Polje). In April, 1992, with the operationally developed
forces of the first strategic echelon (2nd and 4th Military Regions),
and part of the forces of the second strategic echelon (1st and 3rd
Military Regions), it embarked on the realization of the operational
plan of the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
During the first stage of the operation, a coordinated tong-
shaped attack and maneuver in two separate directions, one from
Grahovo-Glamoè-Kupres and the other from Trebinje-Bileæa-
Mostar, were used to break the defense lines and penetrate into
the area of Central Dalmatia via Livno and Ar ano, putting pres-
sure on the city of Split. Part of the forces were supposed to con-
tinue the attack and reach the right bank of the Neretva, i.e. via
Stolovo, subdue the left bank of the Neretva, access the Adriatic
Sea in the region of Neum-Ploèe and unite with the occupation
forces in the region of Bistrina-Doli. If that operational plan had
worked, Bosnia would have been in a squeeze. The second and140
the easiest stage of the operation then would follow, directed
towards Sarajevo and possible minor points of resistance within
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would have consumed little time.
The first stage of the operation failed to achieve the goal,
since on April 23, 1992, defenders managed to halt both pene-
trations, in Livanjsko Polje on the Rujani-Èelebiæ-Koriæina line, as
well as in Stolovi in the Neretva Valley. Bosnia remained
“unclamped”. 
As a result, the operational bases in southern Croatia and
Western Bosnia-Herzegovina were defended. This spatial basis
had a strong strategic significance, which would become clear
during the further course of the war, and especially during the final
actions for the liberation of the occupied territories of the Republic
of Croatia and the assault operations in Western and Central
Bosnia-Herzegovina during the autumn of 1995. The integrity of
the strategic approach points to the fact that this area had the best
and the strongest projection of power during the war. It was also
the area where in early spring of 1992, the JNA and Serbia
reached their strategic peak. This was the crown of the parabola
from which the descending curve of the Serbian Army would move
more and more towards the east.
Figure 8
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New Restructuring and Second Operation Stage
After the failed attempt to clamp down Western Bosnia-
Herzegovina and to totally occupy Sarajevo, the plan had to be
adjusted and the JNA further restructured.54 The command over
both the JNA and Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be
given to General Ratko Mladiæ on 10 May.55 He was placed in
charge of the entire 2nd Military Region and smaller parts of the 1st
and 4th Military Regions, which would eventually form the Army of
the Republika Srpska. The forces of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Military
Regions, deployed in the territories of Serbia and Montenegro,
would enter into the system of the “Army of Yugoslavia” as the mil-
itary of the “new state.”56
Upon taking over the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army of the Republika Srpska, General Mladiæ immediately
embarked on the reorganization of his forces. The 5th Corps was
transformed into 1st Krajina Corps, the 9th and 10th Corps were
transformed into 2nd Krajina Corps, the 17th Corps became the
East-Bosnian Corps, the 4th Corps was renamed the Sarajevo and
Romanija Corps and the 13th Corps became the Herzegovina
Corps. From May 19, 1992 on, the G.S. acted as the supreme
command in the Army of the Republika Srpska, which monitored
the formation of other units and offices. (Operational array of new
corps - Figure 9.).
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In the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were six corps,
consisting of 135,000 men, 550 tanks, over 1,300 atillery pieces
and 430 armored vehicles during the first part of 1992. These
forces also controlled a substantial portion of strategic armament
reserves, ammunition and other equipment important for inde-
pendent combat actions over a long period of time. At the same
time, the first strategic echelon of the “Yugoslav Army” was oper-
ationally developed and deployed on the left and right banks of
the Drina.
After the reorganization of the JNA into two Serbian armies
(the Army of the Republika Srpska and the Army of Yugoslavia),
there was a new action aimed at appropriating as much territory
of Bosnia-Herzegovina as possible. According to the plan, west-
ern Bosnia was to be connected with eastern Bosnia via Posavina,
Sarajevo was to be occupied and the Neretva Valley penetrated.
The entire 1st Krajina Corps and the Corps of Eastern Bosnia, a
smaller portion of the 2nd Krajina Corps and reinforcing forces -
special units of the Serbian Police, the SAO Krajina Militia, Valjevo
Mechanized Brigade (2,500 men and 50 tanks), as well as vol-
unteer formations from Serbia - were all deployed in furtherance
of the goal of conquering Posavina, as a decision point within the
second stage of the strategic operation. Air cover was provided
from airbases in Batajnica (Belgrade) and Banja Luka.
During the operation, which commenced on July 15, 1992,
Serbian troops, having learned their lessons from the war in
Croatia and the first stage of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, took
advantage of their superiority in equipment. Using all sorts of sup-
port (artillery fire, rockets, close air support) and the readjusted
organization (combat and operational groups), implementing a
realistically conceived plan, they succeeded in gaining control
over Bosanska Posavina, minus the broader region of Orašje. The
aggressor’s overwhelming victory was most probably facilitated by
the weaknesses of the defenders of Bosanska Posavina, primarily
in terms of the organization of defense, the coordination of activ-
ities, the training and equipment of units and the commanders’
abilities in planning and implementation of combat actions.
From the point of view of operational skills, the cause of the
occupation of Posavina lay in the disproportional balance of
power favoring the aggressor. This disproportion was primarily in
terms of equipment, which was even more significant in the oper-
ational base from which the military power was projected, rather
than in a willingness to defend or not defend this historical
Croatian region. It was very important that the Serbs projected
their military power from a center, either by targeted dispersion or
centering, without having to negotiate major obstacles. The
defender was forced to do the opposite - a targeted maneuver




























ized road through the valleys of the Neretva and Bosna. The
major causes of the occupation of Bosanska Posavina lay in this
fact.
The siege of Sarajevo transformed itself into an utter deca-
dence of the classical war doctrine (the medieval siege of a forti-
fied city), but was also to become a testing ground for the uncom-
promising use of terroristic military force before the very eyes of
the international community.
The penetration along the Neretva Valley representated yet
another failure for the Serbian forces. The counterattack by the
defenders liberated the left bank of the river in its middle and
lower course.
The further development of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina
took place under the strong influence of international factors.
Unfortunately, each and every one of them would either disguise
their interests, or, if the interests were revealed, would fail to prop-
erly coordinate them. The resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina
crisis would have to be “on hold” for the final operations of the
Croatian Armed Forces. Under very complex international and
national conditions, Croatia was ready, after systematically creat-
ing its Armed Forces, to meet the challenges posed in the mid-
nineties, and contribute to the establishment of peace (the Dayton
Accord) as a factor of strategic balance in the region.
Concluding  Remarks
When it comes to the attainment of the Greater Serbian goals
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian analysts will claim that the JNA
assisted greatly in the establishment of the army of the Bosnia-
Herzegovian Serbs, which it helped to “put on its feet”, and that
the latter, in turn, “liberated Serbian territories” and “protected the
Serb people.” By stating that both in Croatia and in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the JNA fought for the right of the Serb people to
determine their own future, the analysts reveal its true nature and
role as an imperial force in the service of a political idea. In accor-
dance with that concept, the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovian
territories represented a whole which had to be conquered for the
project of Greater Serbia, in keeping with the international cir-
cumstances and the internal concurrence of events.
The military strategic operational plan for the occupation of
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was implemented by the JNA in
increments, without revealing its true intentions, but maintaining
its overall domination with a sufficient degree of adaptability. The
operations were carried out on only one strategic front. Other the-
aters were left to a “new Serbian army”, which was put in place to
safeguard what had been occupied. Benefiting from the initial
advantage in equipment, the JNA could easily adapt its plan,


























pension. It could also shift its decision point, but it could
not exert any influence on the waste of combat potential
(men and equipment), which was very much dependent on
the efficiency of the defense.
By reaching its strategic peak in the region of western
Bosnia-Herzegovina in spring of 1992, the JNA was trans-
formed into three “Serbian armies” under a unified com-
mand. It continued the aggression, carrying out attacks of
low and partly medium intensity. Such a condition could be
interrupted by one or more attack operations which would
defeat not so much the Serbian Army(ies), as much as their
strategic idea. Having realized that they had lost strategic
supremacy after the final operations by Croatian forces,
and that the strategic balance had moved in space to the
line of the Danube-Bosna-Neretva - and that this was
between 50 to 300 kilometers east of the “western Serbian
border” - the Serbian political and military establishments
signed the agreements.
And finally, at the end of these strategic deliberations
and reviews, one would do well to remember Clausewitz
and his position that nobody starts a war, or better still -
nobody in their right mind should start one - before having
a clear idea about what they intend to achieve by the war
and how they intend to wage it.
Aggressors tend to be “peace lovers”. They always
want to appropriate or occupy foreign lands if possible
without any resistance. In order to prevent them, one must
be prepared to wage war, both in its initial or final stages.
Croatia had only one choice. During the initial stage, due
to the lack of arms, the choice was a strategic defense.
During the final stages, the only choice was a strategic
attack which resulted in a change - the establishment of a
balance of power and coordination of its capabilities
against the enemy’s defensive power.
Only an integral approach at the level of strategic
considerations can provide an answer as to what, when
and why something had to be done. It cannot be obtained
by the analysis of separate events, since this would
inevitably lead to simplification. A war is not and cannot be
a simplification, subject to one’s own point of view, or
worse still, to a temporary political interest. Although
aggression is an act of abruptness, war does not arise
abruptly, and its outcome is not the result of an isolated
moment. That is why every analysis of the Homeland War
must contain a judgement on what was done and with
what result, rather than what, strictly speaking, should have





























The Greater Serbian imperial idea was doomed to end in
aggression. The main domino in this idea, the one which had to
fall, was Croatia. This implies that the war was imposed on
Croatia, and that Croatia emerged from the war victorious,
attained its independence, and confirmed the power of strategy.  
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PZO - Air Defense
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UG - Action Group
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1 The most respectable theoretical postulates on the dependence of the army and
social systems based on such a methodological approach are those of M.D.Feld
(The Structure of Violence: Armed Force as Social Systems, Sage Publications,
Beverly Hills, London, 1997).
2 Feld makes a distinction between five different types of military organisations: (a)
external subjugation - imperial army; (b) internal subjugation - feudal army; (c)
closed equality - national army; (d) ideological equality - all-embracing army; (e)
open equality - representative army
3 An important role in the JNA was played by the political bodies which were under
direct influence of the SKJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia). They had a special
political responsibility and cohesion role within the Armed Forces. Other specialized
parts of the Supreme Command were in charge of political activities based on the
following specific tasks: monitoring and estimating the moral and political state of
units and proposing measures for their reinforcement; organisation of social and
political education of the enlisted personnel and recruits based on the Marxist par-
adigm; shaping and organisation of cultural, educational and leisure activities with-
in the units; informing the domestic and international public about the work and life
in the armed forces; encouraging the military personnel to take an active part in the
political and social life of their respective communities; monitoring the propagan-
da and psychological activities by potential adversaries and proposing counter
measures. Moreover, in addition to a well developed political structure within the
Yugoslav Armed Forces, there was also a well developed party mechanism which
could pursue its basic function only in very close cooperation with other political
segments.
4 In an “open equality - representative army” type military (developed democracy)
promotion is granted to technical experts and managers, i.e. executives who know
how to derive the most from the human and material resources in their charge. In
such a system, an officer is not considered to have “the proprietorship” of his com-
mand, or the consciousness of society. He is considered to be an operator within
the national defence mechanism.
5 Lower level units “are overwhelmed” by the mass (high numbers). In such a system,
NCOs bear no significance and officers take over their functions, thus disturbing the
military hierarchy.
6 In developed democracies, this is emphasized as the “civilian supervision over the
military”.
7 The attitude of a military factor towards state authority within an “open-equality type
army” (developed democracy) is entirely different. Military command is responsible
only for combat readiness, but it has no say as to when and against whom the mil-
itary force is going to be used.
8 This postulate has been taken from the “Eastern School of Thought”, where military
power is projected by the quantity, rather than quality of units. The notion used is
“masirovanije sili.”
9 Although scientific research was carried out, and although during the 80s there was147
an opportunity for the army personnel to obtain academic degrees (masters and
doctoral degrees) in military doctrine, those individuals were not appointed to man-
agerial and command positions. Therefore, they could neither significantly influence
the doctrine nor change the well-established postulates on the use of the armed
forces.
10 Formations, headquarters units and institutions formed the Territorial Defence.
Hence, this was a military organisational form which secured the massive numbers
and extended duration in the conduct of the war. The 1974 Constitution for the first
time provided the consititutional and legal framework for the Territorial Defence.
Subsequently, all the Republics (except for Serbia) passed their respective national
defence acts. Hitherto, such a territorial defence gave the Republics a certain
degree of independence in the defense area. This, in turn, reinforced the degree of
their respective statehood and that is why the Territorial Defense was the first to be
targeted by the proponents of  “Great Serbian” idea.
11 Veljko Kadijeviæ: “My Views on Dissolution”, Belgrade, 1993, p. 75
12 The term “administrative borders” used by General Veljko Kadijeviæ illustrates that
the JNA had already adopted the “Greater Serbian” political platform that the bor-
ders of the republics were not state borders. This was an indirect negation of the
federalism of Yugoslavia, and ultimately of Yugoslavia as a state.
13 This case is a blatant example of the disruption of the chain of command that took
place at the highest strategic level. Military Region commanders become absolute-
ly independent of the Supreme Command and reported directly only to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRJ.
14 The intentions are summed up by the following quotations: “The resolution on the
dissolution of the Territorial Defence of Kosovo was passed and enforced on the
grounds that it has been predominantly composed of separatist forces. After its dis-
solution, a new Territorial Defence Organisation of Kosovo was set up, on a much
smaller scale and composed of pro-Yugoslavia oriented people.”
“Significant effort was invested in the final agreement on the dissolution of the
Committees on National Defence and Social Protection. This eliminated the risk
factor which had created confusion in the national defence management and the
armed forces command”.
“One of the most significant measures which was applied in order to paralyse the
perilous constitutional concept of armed forces was the decision to seize weapons
from the Territorial Defence and place them under JNA control”.
15 The very term “strategy of an armed battle” is questionable from the point of view
of war theory and practical activity. If a state adopts its military strategy and makes
it public, this military strategy cannot be reduced to an armed battle only, since there
are a number of other ways to deal with a conflict situation. Why then such an
approach and what does it imply? Only that all conflicts are to be resolved by
armed force. For the armed forces this implies that they are the ones who will be
empowered to determine when, against whom and how they are to act.  Such
armed forces assume the position of an out of control political factor.
16 Strategija ONO i DSZ (ND and TD Strategy), p. 151, SSNO, 1987.
17 People Management and Training for Extraordinary Circumstances and Under War
Conditions, JNA HIGH Political School, p. 45, Belgrade, 1989.


























nario of the geo-strategic relationship was at the time, by saying: “In military terms,
Yugoslavia was not under the protection of an umbrella of the military power of any
bloc. However, it was protected by the umbrella of balance, i.e. the leverage of
powers between the blocs.” On a hypothetical note, had there been a scenario of
military aggression, it would certainly not have remained neutral in such a geo-
strategically sensitive area.
19 The term was coined by Professor Radovan Radinoviæ, Ph.D., a Lieutenant General
whose general’s thesis (a coincidence?), defended in 1985, bore the same title:
”Battle in Space”. The topic was suggested by Admiral Branko Mamula, the then
Federal Secretary of National Defence. The controversy of such a title lies in the fact
that nothing can physically exist if not in a space, especially not a battle (author’s
note.).
20 This was the first time that anybody proposed a plan conceived by a strategic group
whose task was to seize two-thirds of the Adriatic from Croatia.
21 “Not only did Yugoslavia have to be broken up, but its states had to be set at such
variance that no agreement among them was possible either at that time or in the
future. That is why they had to be pushed into a civil war over future state borders”,
Veljko Kadijeviæ, ibid. p. 26.
22 The islands of Vis and Lastovo were almost completely isolated by the ban on for-
eign tourist visits. Despite the importance of these two islands from the military point
of view, it was absolutely unnecessary to develop such a military infrastructure which
would completely pacify them (the construction of apartments for the military, bar-
racks, storage facilities, underground shelters and facilities for ships and rocket sys-
tems). As a result of that, the Croats emigrated from these islands.
23 Towards the end of the 80s, the units of MALI (Marine Assault Landing Infantry) were
renamed into expedition units, so that the MALI Squadron became the Marine
Expeditionary Squadron, the MALI Brigade become the Marine Expeditionary
Brigade and the MALI Division became the Marine Expeditionary Division.  The
renaming was due to the fact that the term “expeditionary” corresponded much bet-
ter to the nature, mission and activities of the US Marine Corps.
24 The 5th Banja Luka Corps and the 17th Tuzla Corps shared the same task: break the
resistance on the Una and Sava rivers and launch a counter-attack towards Una-
Bihaæ-Slunj-Ogulin and Nova Gradiška-Okuèani-Pakrac-Bjelovar.
25 According to Veljko Kadijeviæ, the two main tasks of the continental JNA armies,
predominantly armored mechanized units, were as follows: (1) to “liberate” Eastern
Slavonia; (2) to be the principal manoeuver force of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the
penetration toward Zagreb and Vara din (Podravina and Posavina operational
directions).
26 “As regards the international level, we would have fallen right into the trap, and
immediately or very quickly we would have been exposed not only to different types
of sanctions but also to military interventions and attacks of all sorts. In this way, not
only would Yugoslavia not have been saved, but a new Yugoslavia would have been
created under much more difficult conditions than those under which it was actual-
ly created. To my mind, the subsequent chain of events provided support for our
assessment of the situation at the time,” Veljko Kadijeviæ, ibid., p. 115.
27 To attack the barracks at a time (the war in Slovenia) when neither political nor mil-





























28 Kadijeviæ wrote in general terms about the employment of the JNA forces: “During
this stage of the war, when the JNA is unable to perform its mission, which was to
defend the Serbian people in Croatia by preventing conflicts between nations, it had
to wait for an open attack, which would be visible to all and which would unam-
biguously expose the perpetrator and the victim, and clearly show who was the one
imposing the war, and only then fight back.” (underlined by author) ibid., p. 133.
29 This reveals the connection between this date and the Belgrade scenario (March 9)
when the JNA troops descended upon the streets of Belgrade in order to pacify the
situation. If this had been done in Belgrade, then there was no reason why it could
not have been done in the entire territory of former Yugoslavia. Kosovo 1981,
Kosovo 1987, and Belgrade 1991 were all part of the same plan on how to cre-
ate chaos, then proclaim a state of emergency and use arms. The Belgrade March
events were not an attempt to overthrow Miloševiæ, but an induced and channelled
“chaos” conducive to a state of emergency and the pacification of former
Yugoslavia, and subsequently to the creation of a “Greater Serbia”.
30 Veljko Kadijeviæ, Ibid., p. 128.
31 Veljko Kadijeviæ, Ibid., p. 134.
32 The Instruction was issued in 1990 and signed by the then Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary, General Blagoje Ad iæ. It was dispatched for temporary use during the
period between May 1, 1990 and December 31, 1992. This most likely corre-
sponded to the period during which a “Greater Serbia” was to be created. At the
end of the approval for deployment it was stated that during 1993, the instruction
would be brought in line with the new “strategy of armed combat”, i.e. no longer
with the “strategy of ND and SSP”. SSNO, Belgrade, 1990.
33 Veljko Kadijeviæ, Ibid., p. 135.
34 It should be noted that the plan did not contain the “liberation” of Slovenia, and for
this reason, the war in Slovenia must be regarded differently, but certainly from the
point of view of its impact on the war in Croatia.
35 On different occasions, Tuðman stated that he had been asked and that it had been
proposed to him to attack the JNA during the armed conflict in Slovenia and that
he had refused to do so. I have never commented upon these statements, but I
thought then and I still think that it would have been much better for us if he had
attacked at that time rather than later, as it was obvious that conflict was inevitable,
and that time was not on our side.   And for the reasons elaborated in detail in the
section on the deployment of the JNA, we were obliged at that stage of the conflict
to wait for an attack, rather than to initiate one.Veljko Kadijeviæ, Ibid., p. 129.
36 Veljko Kadijeviæ: “My Views of Dissolution,” Belgrade, 1993, p. 146.
37 Veljko Kadijeviæ, ibid., p. 145 - 147.
38 See: ”Preparations for Aggression Against Croatia or Transformation of JNA into the
Serbian Imperial Force”, Hrvatski Vojnik, no. 26, August 1997.
39 Ibid., pp. 11-13.
40 The term group is conditional in order to highlight its true intention.
41 The strategic peak or the strategic culmination point is the value of the maximum
military power of one side in the war at a certain point in time and in a certain area.
After reaching the peak, the military power of the attacking side starts to decline,
but it never reaches a value close to zero.


























Independence War: Decision on When to Stop”, Norman Cigar, ERASMVS, April
1997, pp. 37-54.
43 Clausewitz wrote the following on this subject: “The goal of an attack is to occupy
the enemy territory. This implies that the advance must last until the superiority is
spent. This aims at the goal, but it may also lead away from it. If we know the num-
ber of elements in the equation of powers, then it becomes clear how difficult it may
be in particular cases to determine which one of the adversaries is superior. Often,
it all depends on the silk thread of fantasy. All depends on being able to foresee the
peak by a refined spiritual spark of assessment.”
Since the joint goal of the JNA and Serbia was the occupation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, they must have provided in their war plans for the power to do that,
as their plans had provided for the forces necessary for the war in Croatia. The
Serbian predominance could only be used up in the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, during one of the stages of that war. (author  note).
44 Hrvatski vojnik (Croatian Soldier), no. 26, 1997, ibid. p. 16.
45 This strategic principle is often forgotten or ignored, hence the conclusion that
Croatia could have carried out an assault strategic operation as early as 1991
and/or 1992.
46 “There are many wars in which the actual waging of war accounts for the lesser
period of time, and the rest is suspension,” Karl von Clauzewitz, “On War”, p. 59,
MORH, Zagreb, 1997.
47 Op. cit. Kadijeviæ.
48 By the end of July 1991, the JNA had agreed to withdraw its formations (14th and
31st corps) from Slovenia within the following three months. The retreat  was planned
to be completed by the end of October 1991. Both formations were initially
deployed in Western Serbia, a larger part of the 31st Maribor and a smaller part of
the 14th Ljubljana Corps were incorporated in the 17th Corps, which had sustained
major losses in Western Slavonia, and a larger part of the 14th Corps was incorpo-
rated in the 2nd Podgorica Corps.
At the beginning of December, the 13th Rijeka Corps was shipped to the harbour
of Bar in Montenegro. A larger part of this corps was deployed in Eastern
Herzegovina at the beginning of 1992, and from these forces, the Trebinje – Bileæa
OG forces were then formed. The units of the 10th Zagreb Corps were initially
moved to Slunj, and  subsequently to Bihaæ. They formed the nucleus of the newly
formed Bihaæ Corps, which was later renamed the 2nd Krajina Corps. Likewise, dur-
ing November and December of 1991, a smaller part of the 10th Corps was incor-
porated in the 17th Tuzla Corps. The last JNA formation which left the territory of
Croatia was the 9th Knin Corps, which was deployed in the territory of Western
Bosnia: Bosansko Grahovo-Glamoè-Kupres.
49 The area consisted  of four corps: 1st Belgrade, 12th Novi Sad, 17th Tuzla and 24th
Kragujevac and a Guards division and the Defense of the City of Belgrade, with a
total of 75,000 people. 
50 After the retreat from Macedonia, the 41st and the 42nd Corps were incorporated
into the 3rd Military Region and deployed in Zajeèar, Knja evac and Paraæin, and
Leskovac and Valjevo respectively. The latter Corps would be transformed into a
new, 20th Corps (Leskovac). The command of the 3rd Military Region was moved






























51 The 2nd Military Region comprised of the following: 5th Corps (Banja Luka), 10th
Corps (Bihaæ), 4th Corps (Sarajevo) and 9th Corps (Knin), i.e. (Grahovo-Glamoè-
Kupres).
52 Within this Military Region were: 2nd Corps (Podgorica), 37th Corps ( Uzice) and 13th
Corps (Mostar) and OG Trebinje-Bileca (Bileca).
53 This must have been a major challenge for the intelligence service, since it pointed
to the importance of being well-informed about the specific composition of every
unit in order to be able to make realistic judgements on their real combat poten-
tial. In other words, considering only the “by-the-book” composition of a particular
formation may have resulted in erroneous conclusions or decision-making.
54 During the clamping operations and blockade, i.e. the attempt to conquer
Sarajevo, the commanding officers of the JNA corps were as follows: the 13th
(Herzegovina) Corps, Major General Momèilo Perišiæ, the 9th (Kupres, Glamoè,
Grahovo) Corps Major General Savo Kovaèeviæ; the 10th (Western Bosnia) Corps,
Major General, Špiro Ninkoviæ; the 17th (Eastern Bosnia) Corps, Lieutenant General
Savo Jankoviæ; the 5th (Banja Luka) Corps, Major General Vladimir Vukoviæ; and the
4th Corps (deployed around Sarajevo and partly within the city itself), Major General
Vojislav Ðurðevac.
55 The order on the structuring of the “VRS” was signed by Lieutenant General Blagoje
Ad iæ on May 10, 1992. At the same time, General Milutin Kukanjac was detained
in the Sarajevo JNA Center. The order reads:  “The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be
comprised of the following members: Chairman, Lieutenant General Ratko Mladiæ;
Chief-of-Staff, Major General Manojlo Milovanoviæ, Assistant Chief for Morale and
Information, Major General Milan Gvero; Assistant Chief for the Rear, Major
General Ðorðe Ðukiæ; Chief of Security, Colonel Zdravko Tolimir; and Chief of
Mobilisation, Colonel Miæo Grubor.”
56 Army of Yugoslavia Foundation Day was July 16, 1992. There was an attempt to
use this day of the “Third Serbian Army” in the territory of former Yugoslavia in a
symbolical way in order to show that the JNA was not the Serbian imperial force,
but rather a natural “consequence” of the string of events relative to the protection
of the Serbian people. “Military regions” were abolished and replaced by the Army
as the highest strategic formation. “The Army of Yugoslavia” consisted of the 1st, 2nd
and 3rd Armies, divided into corps and brigades.
References
1. Veljko Kadijeviæ (1993). Moje viðenje raspada. Beograd: Politika.
2. Strategija oru ane borbe (1983). Beograd: SSNO, Centar za strategijska istra ivan-
ja.
3. Strategija ONO i DSZ (1987). Beograd: SSNO, Centar za strategijska istra ivanja i
studije.
4. Privremeno uputstvo (1990). Upotreba strategijskih grupacija. Beograd: SSNO.
5. Rukovoðenje i rad s ljudima na obuci, izvanrednim prilikama i ratnim uslovima
(1989). Beograd: Visoka politièka škola JNA.
6. Marinko Ogorec (1997). Vojna sila bivše Jugoslavije. Zagreb.
7. Ideja manevra OG JADRAN na JPV (1986-1990). Split: VPO, KŠRV “Romanija”.
N
AT
IO
N
AL
 S
EC
U
RI
TY
 A
N
D
 T
H
E 
FU
TU
RE
 1
 (1
) 2
00
0.
152
